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Transport and land use planning are in a state of flux. Projects face increased technical, social, 
financial, political and legal complexities while the conventional project planning approach is 
struggling to deal with these complexities. As a result, many projects fail to be completed in time 
and on budget. To deal with this issue, alternative planning approaches are developed in 
planning theory and literature. On the one hand, a more communicative project planning 
approach has been developed. On the other, a more programme-oriented planning approach has 
been suggested. While the former trend has inspired many empirical studies, the latter trend has 
received less research attention. Therefore, in this article, we focus on the trend towards a more 
programme-oriented planning approach. The objective of this article is to gain insight into how 
programmes impact project performance in light of project complexities. To this end, we 
conducted a case study research into how two different programmes – the Urgent Approach 
Programme and the National Collaboration Programme on Air Quality – impact the delivery of 
the national highway project A4 between Burgerveen-Leiden in the Netherlands. We used desk 
research and conducted 20 semi-structured interviews on project and programme level with 
various stakeholders. Our analysis reveals that programmes do not really influence technical and 
social complexities. These are predominantly affected by the introduction of a communicative 
project planning approach. Through restructuring project-specific political discussions and 
providing solutions to legal issues by explicitly connecting multiple projects to each other, 
programmes can be an effective means to deal with political and legal complexities.  
 
Keywords: infrastructure planning, infrastructure projects, project management, programme 
management, planning delays, planning costs. 
1. Introduction 
Transport and land use planning are in a state of flux. The traditional planning approach focuses 
on narrowly defined transport infrastructure projects and limited stakeholder participation (see, 
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e.g. Van der Heijden, 1996; Wilson, 2001; Alderman et al., 2013). In line with project management 
theory, an infrastructure project is usually regarded as a single intervention in the infrastructure 
network, characterized by a fixed time schedule and dedicated budget. In planning practice, 
however, infrastructure projects are prompted by multiple and diverse interests, dynamism and 
complexity. As a consequence, transport infrastructure projects are characterized by systematic 
budget and time overruns, and many projects fail to meet expectations (see, e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003; Cantarelli et al., 2010; De Jong et al., 2013). 
According to Ennis (1997), it has become essential for infrastructure provision to recognize that 
project implementation involves actors with different objectives. For transport infrastructure 
projects to proceed, “the key actors must negotiate and bargain in order to produce a 
compromise which is acceptable to all parties” (p. 1944). Thus, projects need to focus also on the 
external context, which challenges the traditional approach where project management 
predominantly focuses on internal project control and less on continuous interaction with the 
environment. Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) and Wilson (2001) emphasize that transport land use 
planning should embrace communicative approaches, to allow for inter-subjective interaction 
and consensus to develop. Consensus in this respect can be seen as a means to overcome possible 
stakeholder dispute and enable swift project delivery. 
Another important trend in planning literature concentrates on advancing project delivery by 
focusing on more holistic planning methods (see, e.g. Sussman, 2002; Sussman et al., 2005; 
Hansman et al., 2006). Following Keck et al. (2010), this often results in proposals for improved 
programme management. That is, projects in transport and land use planning are no longer 
considered to be undertaken in ‘splendid isolation’. Instead, these projects are assumed to be 
strongly interrelated on a network level (Leendertse et al., 2012). Programmes are proposed as a 
governance mechanism to align these interrelated projects in order to achieve a certain outcome 
on network level. For example, programmes may focus on goals as improving the overall 
transport network performance in a specific area (Kuroda et al., 2008). In the USA, the AASHTO 
(2007), in this respect, calls for a focus on these ‘macro goals’, for government organizations can 
“focus efforts on achieving overall programme goals, rather than on endless individual project 
scrutiny” (p. 1). 
Whereas the trend towards context-sensitive projects initiated a boom of academic studies and 
publications (see, e.g. Woltjer, 2000; Wilson, 2001; Walter and Scholtz, 2007; Heeres et al., 2012), 
the emerging trend towards programmes and outcome-oriented planning has received less 
attention in (planning) literature. However, in planning practice this trend is clearly noticeable as 
publications in several countries illustrate. Examples are AASHTO (2007) and Keck et al. (2010) 
reporting on programmes in the United States, the OGC (2010) in the United Kingdom, and the 
VROM-raad (2007) and Groothuijse et al. (2011) in the Netherlands. According to programme 
management literature (see, e.g. Artto et al., 2009; PMI, 2013) programmes allow for top-down 
management and create additional oversight, which leads to improved project delivery. 
Nevertheless, to date limited empirical insight is available on how a programme, as a governance 
mechanism, affects project performance. Therefore, the objective of this article is to gain insight 
into how programmes impact project performance in light of project complexities that are 
experienced in planning practice. On the basis of a literature review we distinguish five types of 
complexity that influence project performance. These are (i) technical complexities, (ii) social 
complexities, (iii) financial complexities, (iv) political complexities, and (v) legal complexities. In 
this study we aim to gain greater insight into how programmes respond to these complexities on 
project level. To this end, we have conducted an in-depth case study into the national highway 
project A4, connecting the Dutch cities of Burgerveen and Leiden, and two related programmes: 
the Urgent Approach Programme (Programma Spoedaanpak, [PS]) and the National Collaboration 
Programme on Air Quality (Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit [NSL]). Both 
programmes were focused towards improving project delivery. We have undertaken desk 
research and conducted 20 interviews with participants both on project and programme level. 
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In the next section, we will outline the complexities in transport and land use planning on project 
level in more detail. In addition, we elaborate on trends in planning theory and practice. In 
section three we explain our methodological framework and case selection. In section four we 
describe our case on the basis of these project complexities and developments in transport and 
land use planning, and in section five, we assess how programmes influence the complexities on 
project level. Finally, in section six we present our conclusions. 
2. Developments in transport and land use planning 
Banister et al. (2011) contend that transport and land use planning has been largely concentrated 
on road-based transport. According to Banister et al. (2011), the policy domain is ‘locked’ into an 
automobile based transport system. As transport policy has long focused on matching demand 
with supply by significantly extending the road infrastructure network, the sunk costs of 
abandoning or replacing this system using alternatives are considered to be disproportionately 
high. This results in a transport and land use planning that is still largely focused on road 
infrastructure development. 
2.1 Conventional infrastructure projects 
Classically, additional road infrastructure is to be developed based on a specific and extensive 
problem definition developed entirely within government. As Olumide et al. (2010) describe, 
through the focus on measurable and quantitative input data, the tendency exists to either ignore 
basic uncertainties or make rigorous assumptions about the distribution of uncertainties 
(compare Leijten et al., 2010). As a result, the complexities of the project are reduced to technical 
engineering problems that can be solved by following a detailed action plan. Ideally, as Engwall 
(2002) explains, “projects should be so thoroughly planned that the objectives are stipulated in 
detail and frozen, before any practical action is undertaken” (p. 266). The stipulated output 
should be explicit, consistent and stable over time and specified in three interrelated dimensions: 
(i) scope, what should the project achieve; (ii) time, when should it be finished; and (iii) cost, what 
resources should be spent (cf. Kerzner, 2009). In practice, this results in narrowly defined projects 
where spatial and functional relationships to other infrastructure elements are not well taken into 
account. “What is more, due to the focus on a single solution, the opportunities to engage in a 
dialogue or to arrive at a situation of mutual understanding among actors are limited. 
Alternatives tend to be ignored, or even considered as a threat” (Romein et al., 2003, p. 211). 
Furthermore, it becomes clear that project implementation is considered to be mainly making 
sure that a predefined input of the project will lead to a predefined output. Risks are to be 
avoided and developments have to be controlled. Project management has an internal focus: 
ensuring compliance to the predefined project lifecycle. 
2.2 Infrastructure project policies 
The focus on ensuring compliance to a predefined project lifecycle also means that this approach 
is experiencing difficulties in responding to complexity and change (Jafaari, 2003). This, while, as 
for example Hertogh and Westerveld (2010) show, nowadays infrastructure projects are 
confronted with increasing complexities. Social complexities, for example, arise from the fact that 
involved government agencies do no longer always allow construction of the infrastructure 
project on their territory without prior consultation and permission. In addition, citizens, 
businesses, and civic organizations also want to be consulted. Otherwise they frequently resort to 
litigation, often pointing towards environmental externalities, introducing legal complexities into 
the project. As Mostashari and Sussman (2005) record, although only a small amount of the 
litigations actually results in court injunctions, “many result in delays for the project, as well as 
continued bitterness and resistance towards implementation expressed in different forms by 
marginalised stakeholders” (p. 357). In addition, on the basis of amongst others Jafaari (2003) and 
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Hertogh and Westerveld (2010) three additional complexities in infrastructure projects can be 
identified: technical complexities, financial complexities and political complexities. Both technical and 
financial complexities share close relationships with social complexity. Discussion among 
stakeholders often concerns technical characteristics, i.e. necessary scope changes that again put 
pressure on established financial forecasts. This is also shown by for instance the FHWA (2000) in 
the United States and the Committee Elverding (2008) in the Netherlands. The FHWA report, for 
example, identifies lack of (additional) funding, local controversy and low political attention (i.e. 
political complexity) as major sources of delay, while the Committee Elverding points towards 
the erratic political decision-making process that characterize many infrastructure projects, and 
indicates that this also influences technical characteristics and financial forecasts. In this article, 
we distinguish social, legal, technical, financial and political complexities, which impact project 
performance. 
2.3 Infrastructure project policies 
Largely in response to increasing social complexities, the concepts of negotiation, mutual gains, 
and consensus (see, e.g. Fisher and Ury, 1983; Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987) have been 
discussed intensively in planning literature as part of the ‘communicative turn in planning’. This 
relates to concepts such as collaborative planning (Healey, 1997), consensus planning (Woltjer, 
2000) and process management (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof, 2002; Edelenbos and Klijn, 2009). 
The traditional infrastructure approach was characterized by developing a detailed course of 
action at the outset of the project based on rational models and expert knowledge. Subsequently, 
project implementation was seen as a matter of constructing the infrastructure project according 
to the predefined scope and defending the original ideas to outsiders. In contrast, the 
communicative approach is much more sensitive to both public and private stakeholder interests 
by aiming at a widely supported, integrative and participative process. Following a 
communicative project planning approach in infrastructure planning implies a shift from more 
internal control towards responsiveness of external developments. In theory, stakeholder 
participation supposedly leads to a smoother decision making process and more inclusive project 
design (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof, 2002; Committee Elverding, 2008). However, this does not 
always show in planning practice. Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) conclude that by and large, 
stakeholder participation is grounded in “political expediency” and is mainly applied as a 
planning instrument. In addition, Woltjer (2000) concludes that projects provided rather limited 
attention to the enrichment and empowerment of the planning process. Rather, the participatory 
processes functioned as a management tool to advance the implementation of particular projects. 
Another development in planning literature emerging from the field of engineering systems is 
the focus on more holistic planning methods. As mentioned above, the conventional 
infrastructure project approach is focused on delivering a predefined ‘output’ specified in terms 
of scope, time and costs. Infrastructure projects are considered to be independent, resulting in 
individual project scrutiny. Instead, Sussman et al. (2005) emphasize that infrastructure projects 
are interlinked and interdependent because they are part of a wider transportation system and 
also need to be managed as such. Although theoretically this means that both technological and 
societal aspects are taken into account, system based management seems to be predominantly 
focused on ‘hard’ technological aspects. This entails not only a focus on management and 
operations, the regional scale and different modalities, but also, when it comes to systems based 
governance of interrelated projects, a focus on improved programme management (Keck et al., 
2010). A programme-oriented planning approach, i.e., simultaneous management of interrelated 
projects, is expected to deliver synergetic benefits that are not obtained if the projects are 
implemented independently. In planning practice, coordination and overall control of projects is 
considered to improve, which is expected to positively impact project implementation and to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. As Pellegrinelli (2011) explains, projects focus on outputs or 
specified deliverables, whereas programmes focus on outcomes or desired end states, for 
example of a transport system. 
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Figure 1. Alternative planning approaches 
 
Figure 1 depicts the two types of approaches that are mentioned in literature to deal with 
complexity and enable infrastructure development. The first type, on project level, implies a shift 
from conventional towards communicative project planning approaches; the second type of 
approach implies a shift from project oriented planning focused on output towards programme-
oriented planning focused at realizing an outcome or obtaining a desired end state.  
As noticed by Lycett et al. (2004), programme management is often regarded as a scaled-up 
version of project management (see also Pellegrinelli, 2011). On programme level, project 
interdependencies can be identified and managed, thereby reducing the incidence of work 
backlogs, reworks and delays, and enabling efficient (re)distribution of shared resources to 
projects which deliver most value for money or return on investment. Typically, this implies that 
projects are initiated within the scope of the programme. In other words, first the programme, 
programme goal and lifecycle are established, which is followed by the initiation of several 
projects (Lycett et al., 2004; OGC, 2007; PMI, 2013). Infrastructure planning, however, shows 
frequent examples of projects that are initiated on the principles of the conventional project 
planning approach, are subsequently confronted with complexities, and in turn experience delays 
and cost overruns (see, e.g. Morris, 1990; Williams et al., 2009; Hertogh and Westerveld, 2010). 
While there is already extensive literature on how communicative approaches might aid project 
delivery under these circumstances, insights in how a programme-oriented planning approach 
might impact project performance are limited. The notion that programmes are often developed 
in the context of projects, and in this way, structure and possibly restructure the context in which 
projects have to be implemented is rather new. Moreover, literature that does take account of this 
perspective traditionally focuses on how the projects that were already undertaken influence the 
development and character of these programmes that are developed in the context of these 
projects (see, for example Vereecke et al., 2004; Van Buuren et al., 2010). In comparison to these 
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publications, this article aims to provide more insight into how such programmes impact project 
performance, rather than the other way around.  
In the next section, we will outline the case study and the methodology we used to gain greater 
insight into how programmes impact the complexities we identified on project level. These 
include social, legal, technical, financial and political complexities. 
3. Methodology and case selection  
To gain insight into how programmes in transport and land use planning affect complexities on 
project level we used a case study methodology. This is a relevant approach when posing “how” 
or “why” questions concerning “contemporary” phenomena over which investigators have little 
control (Yin, 2009; Hennink et al., 2011).  
We chose a Dutch case study which would entail the different complexities. The Netherlands is 
well-known for its advanced planning system (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2001; Van der Valk, 2002). 
Hajer and Zonneveld (2001) show that against a strong legal background, consultation between 
government parties and between the government and the public functions as the backbone of this 
planning system. In the Netherlands, consultation between government parties is especially 
important as both central as well as decentralized governments are provided with planning 
instruments that can severely influence decision making on infrastructure projects. For example, 
national infrastructure planning projects that are initiated by central government are still 
dependent on environmental permits that are issued on the local level by the municipalities the 
infrastructure projects crosses. 
These environmental permits are especially important as the Dutch legislative system assumes a 
direct link between planning consent and environmental permits. This means that every 
infrastructure project has to take environmental standards into account, or else it will be 
annulled. As Zonneveld et al. (2008) show, where other countries still have room for negotiation, 
in the Netherlands a sharp boundary exists between plans that meet and plans that fail to meet 
the environmental standards. As a consequence, infrastructure projects are faced with severe 
legal complexities. In addition, consultation is cumbersome (Committee Elverding, 2008; Arts, 
2010). In their review the OECD (2007) mentions that the Netherlands suffers from ‘political 
overload’. Many areas of administration are involved in decision-making, in particular in 
infrastructure projects. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of steps in Dutch transport infrastructure planning 
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In our case selection we focused on the 58 national highway infrastructure projects that had to be 
finalized in the Netherlands in the period 2010 – 2020. Some of which are still in the planning 
stage, others are meanwhile being constructed. We first focused on the throughput time for each 
project between the moment the project was approved by national politics and a Memo on Scope 
& Detail was issued and the moment the Draft Route Decision was issued by the Ministry. As 
outlined in Figure 2, this Draft Route Decision is then translated into the Final Route Decision, 
which is also the legal document used in court in case of litigation (see Arts, 2004 and 2010 for a 
complete overview of Dutch planning procedures). The time from the Memo on Scope & Detail to 
the Draft Route Decision is the time allocated for consultation in the Dutch planning system. We 
established the throughput time for each project. We found that, in extreme cases, consultation 
can take up to over 80 months (6.5 years). We assumed that the longer the consultation, the more 
political and social complexities the project would encounter. We further studied whether the 
project was litigated and whether this would actually result in court injunction issues. We 
assumed that litigation followed by injunction would show that the project encountered legal 
complexities.  
Out of 58 infrastructure projects, 5 consultation cases took longer than 60 months (5 years). 
Another 5 projects ended up in court injunction. The only case to show a long consultation time 
(76 months), finally resulting in court injunction, was the widening between Burgerveen and 
Leiden of national highway A4 from a two-lane dual carriageway to a three-lane dual 
carriageway. Other sections of the A4 were already widened, and, as outlined in Figure 3, this 
project concerned the last 20 km stretch, which proved to be very difficult. It had taken from 
September 1997 until January 2004 to come to a fully supported Draft Route Decision that was 
eventually translated into a Final Route Decision in February 2006. This Final Route Decision was 
litigated, which ended up in injunction by court in July 2007. 
In the case analysis below, we first focus on the issues that caused this project’s long consultation 
time and the reason for the court injunction (period until July 2007). To this end, we have 
conducted a desk study of court readings by the Dutch Administrative Court of the Council of 
State (Raad van State), studied available scientific accounts of developments in policy domains, 
and analysed policy documents such as formal project documents and EIA-reports. In addition, 
we conducted 5 in-depth interviews with stakeholders directly involved in this project. The 
interviews were semi-structured and consisted of thematic open-ended questions. We focused 
particularly on which complexities could be identified on project level and how these 
complexities were experienced by the interviewees over the project lifecycle. We have held 
interviews with project management, parent organisations and local politicians. Furthermore, in 
our study we have specifically focused on developments at programme level from 2007 onwards 
in response to the difficult project delivery, particularly in two programmes considered essential 
in enabling project delivery in the case of the A4 Burgerveen - Leiden. These are the Urgent 
Approach Programme (Programma Spoedaanpak, [PS]), and the National Collaboration 
Programme on Air Quality (Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit, [NSL]). Both 
programmes aim to improve project delivery. To gain insight in the effects of these programmes 
we also conducted document analysis into formal programme documents and programme 
evaluations. In addition, we conducted 15 in-depth interviews with stakeholders involved in the 
two different programmemes. A large part of the interviews were with people from the Ministry 
of Transport who were involved in one of the programmes. However, in order to gain 
information from all programme participants, we have also conducted interviews with 
stakeholders at lower levels of government. Similar to the interviews on project level, these 
interviews were also semi-structured and consisted of open-ended questions. The topics, 
however, were different. In the interviews on programme level we focused on programme 
management, the interaction between programmes and projects, the impact of contextual 
developments and the possibilities on programme level to mitigate the impact of these 
developments. 
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4. Complexities in an infrastructure project: the case of the national 
highway A4  
 
Figure 3. Geographic location of highway A4 Burgerveen - Leiden in the Netherlands 
The national highway A4 was established in 1958 and is an important link in the national 
highway network in the Randstad conurbation (the economic core of the Netherlands) and an 
important international hinterland connection. The A4 connects the country’s two mainports: 
Rotterdam harbour and Schiphol Amsterdam Airport (see Figure 3). Consequently, the road 
generates still growing amounts of traffic. To supply for this growth, in 1994 the Ministry of 
Transport decided to expand the highway from a two-lane to a three-lane dual carriageway 
(V&W, 1994) in order to improve traffic circulation and reduce congestion. 
Studying different options to improve traffic circulation took three years and showed that 
alternatives for expanding the highway, e.g. road pricing and public transport improvement, 
would not alter the modal split enough to reduce road traffic and congestion (V&W, 1997). 
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Therefore, all parties agreed that highway expansion was necessary, but disagreed on the way to 
do so. Figure 3 shows the complex spatial situation in which the highway A4 Burgerveen – 
Leiden had to be altered. Not only are multiple municipalities (Leiden, Leiderdorp and 
Zoeterwoude) affected by the road (e.g. noise, air pollution, land take issues), also solutions to 
bridge or tunnel the Oude Rijn river had to be generated.  
In the original situation, the fact that the highway was located on an elevated bank (Picture 1 in 
Figure 3) made it a significant visual barrier. Ministry of Transport studies showed that the 
option of constructing a short stretch of road below surface level in an open trench would be 
compliant to air and noise regulation and deliver the highest value for money (Picture 2 in Figure 
3). However, both the municipalities of Leiden, Leiderdorp and Zoeterwoude as well as citizens 
pleaded for a longer open trench, accompanied by extra mitigation measures such as horizontally 
placed concrete pollution and noise barriers (Picture 3 in Figure 3). Nevertheless, the Ministry of 
Transport chose their first option and started an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on this 
basis, initiating severe discussions (V&W, 1997). A former alderman, for example, states that “this 
decision created a lot of turmoil. Not only on political level, but also within the civil society. It felt like we 
were all against the Ministry of Transport.” Eventually, involved municipalities decided not to issue 
the necessary permits to the Ministry of Transport and a large group of citizens and 
municipalities even went to court in order to prevent the implementation of this project. 
The project thus encountered severe social complexities. In addition, since involved stakeholders 
wanted a more advanced road design, this increased the project’s technical complexity. As a 
former project manager explains “if we would include the wishes of the other parties, this would really 
push our technological limits, particularly with respect to technologies to compensate for noise and air 
pollution”. As a result of the different opinions on what the project would entail and how it 
should look, the project reached an impasse. The Ministry of Transport advocated their road 
design regardless of external influences. This was in line with political commissioning for the 
project (TMC, 2000). Politics focused on realizing optimal value for money. However, as has 
become clear from the interviews, the Ministry decided to withdraw their Final Route Decision 
Plan in 1999. “It appeared that the project opponents’ could put some valid points forward which would 
have led to court injunction” explains a national policy officer. Such withdrawal at the stage of 
taking the Final Route Decision never occurred before and has not happened since.  
Both literature and the interviews make clear that in order to break the impasse the Ministry of 
Transport had to actively respond to discussions among stakeholders, rather than take the official 
procedural stance of waiting until courts claims were made. A stakeholder manager involved in 
the project, for example, mentions that “the Ministry of Transport has always been narrowly focused 
on road development. However, smart process management made us more aware of the context we have to 
operate in.” Indeed, in 1999, the Ministry of Transport together with the municipalities of Leiden 
and Leiderdorp, initiated a quick scan searching for possibilities to improve the road’s landscape 
fit. This showed that when the focus would shift from just realizing additional infrastructure 
towards a more regional and integrated approach, the more expensive alternative (Picture 3 in 
Figure 3) could be financed by capturing the value of real estate and industrial developments 
within the area.  
In this way, the project would become a public-public partnership called W4 after the four 
components the project would focus on: housing, working, water, roads (in Dutch: Wonen, 
Werken, Water, Wegen). The partnership included the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of 
Environment, the province of Zuid-Holland and the municipalities of Leiden, Leiderdorp and 
Zoeterwoude. All stakeholders agreed on this expanded scope. However, this did not only 
introduce technical complexities, but also additional financial complexities. The total investment 
of the conglomerate of local and regional governments amounted to € 33 million, initiating a long 
political discussion on different ways of financing the project. A former alderman, for example, 
denotes that “most discussions went about money. You have to keep in mind that also small 
municipalities were involved that would have to make relatively large investments. In case this went wrong 
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that could bankrupt the entire municipality of for instance Zoeterwoude. We had to find a sensible way to 
balance risks, investments and possible returns”. As a result of the political discussion, it took until 
2002 before final financial arrangements were made, a joint ‘master plan’ was developed, and, the 
collaboration covenant was signed between the authorities involved.  
However, even after decisions had been made on the financial arrangement, political discussion 
on who would pay for what continued. Still, different financial frameworks were applied by 
various stakeholders and different forecast scenarios were used. Furthermore, it proved to be 
difficult for smaller public organizations as municipalities to maintain financial commitment 
throughout the project. Largely as a result of financial disputes, it took until 2006 before the Final 
Route Decision was issued and the road could be constructed. To move things along, the Ministry 
of Transport agreed to provide additional funding, which took away most financial complexities. 
In the meantime, everybody was convinced that the project would be appropriately fitted into the 
landscape and that it would be beneficial for all stakeholders involved through its focus on 
regional development. Even local residents were in favor of the project. The open trench would 
be fitted with horizontally placed air and noise barriers, improving air and noise conditions 
compared to the old situation. In the meantime, the highway had become one of largest 
bottlenecks in the Dutch highway system (VID, 2007). The high levels of congestion caused high 
levels of air pollution and noise nuisance. Local residents realized that expanding the road would 
improve this situation (VVD Leiderdorp, 2007). A local news network, for example, mentioned 
that “the people who live close to highway are positive as they expect that the amount of noise will reduce 
when the project is finished” (Omroep West, 2009). However, despite the large consensus amongst 
stakeholders, one environmental interest group could not reconcile the construction of a new 
road with their environmental principles and went to court. They stated that additional research 
into the impact of the new road on air quality was necessary to gain a full overview of the impact 
on air quality in the region. The interviews indicate that the court’s 2007 decision surprised many 
involved stakeholders. The court followed the environmental interest group’s reasoning and 
decided that the project could not be implemented before all significant effects of the road on the 
air quality would have been studied and possibly mitigated (ABRvS, 2007). The project 
stakeholders did not anticipate this outcome and felt dejected. As a policy officer explains: “the 
day the high court announced its decision was really a black day for all of us. Nobody expected this 
decision; it came as a complete shock to us. How could we possibly take all effects into account?”. In the 
meantime, the project came to a standstill.  
Over time, the project had encountered several complexities, outlined in table 1 (below). Some 
had been dealt with by shifting towards a more communicative project planning approach. 
Nevertheless, in 2007, the project reached an impasse. The question was: how to move forward 
now? 
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Table 1. Complexities on project level in the case of the A4 Burgerveen – Leiden 
Complexities: Appearance in project  
Technical Project scope was constantly under pressure. Initially, the project was 
only aimed at requirements of the Ministry of Transport. Later on, other 
stakeholder wishes regarding working, housing and water issues also had 
to be taken into account. This resulted in a broad array of complex 
technical measures both for the road design as well as for the mitigating 
measures as horizontally placed noise barriers and noise absorptive wall 
padding. 
Initially, the Ministry of Transport was little responsive towards the needs 
of local stakeholders focusing on delivering value for money. However, 
both decentralized government agencies and local residents opposed to 
the project, resulting in huge social dynamics. Eventually, the Ministry of 
Transport, as project principal, understood that it had to move with rather 
than fight against these dynamics and agreement amongst authorities was 
reached.  
The enlarged project scope could only be realized if additional funding 
was found. An innovative Public-Public Partnership (called W4) was used 
to pool the financial resources of different governmental agencies. Still it 
proved difficult for partners to maintain financial commitment 
throughout the project. 
The initially narrow project scope was in line with the political mandate at 
the time. After the collaboration covenant had been signed by all 
authorities, it proved challenging to maintain political attention, which 
was caused in part by the election cycle of both local and national 
politicians. 
It was thought that the project was able to comply to all legal 
requirements, until the project was faced with the court decision that all 
significant effects on the air quality had to be taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
 
 
 
 
Political 
 
 
 
 
Legal 
 
In practice, it proved difficult to take note of all significant effects on the air quality caused by a 
specific project. Through jurisprudence infrastructure projects were faced with the task of 
calculating significant effects in more detail and for larger areas (Blijenberg et al., 2008; Arts et al. 
2010). This was not only true for the A4 Leiden-Burgerveen project but also for other road 
projects. For instance, in another road infrastructure project, the highway A74, this resulted in an 
air quality study covering a 160-km stretch from the city of Venlo to the town of Ridderkerk, 
while the project only entails 2.5 kilometer of new road near the city of Venlo. When, next to the 
highway projects of the A4 and A74 also another project failed, discussions in Parliament led to 
the establishment of a special committee, the Committee Elverding. This Committee – mentioned 
after the last name of its chairman Peter Elverding, who was the top executive of chemical 
company DSM at the time – was tasked with the investigation of the cumbersome planning and 
realization of infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. In 2008 it finished its advice. In response 
to this advice, the Ministry of Transport issued new legislation. A new law, the Acceleration Law 
(Wet Versnelling Besluitvorming Wegenprojecten), was ratified in April 2009. This law contained two 
major changes. First, in response to court verdicts as in case of the national highway A4, the 
study area for air quality was narrowed down in the case of infrastructure projects. This was 
made possible by the simultaneous development of a National Collaboration Programme on Air 
Quality (Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit, [NSL]). The second change for 
infrastructure projects was that they could refer to this programme on air quality matters, which 
contained all important spatial and infrastructure projects to be undertaken on different 
administrative levels in the period 2009 – 2015 (Arts et al., 2010; Busscher et al., 2014). The 
programme included projects from the Ministry of Transport, various provinces and also several 
municipalities. The cumulative impact of these projects on air quality was calculated per square 
kilometer throughout the whole of the Netherlands. All stakeholders would have to implement 
mitigating measures in order to compensate for the negative impact of new infrastructure. By 
doing this programmatically, this could be done at once and no longer on a project-by-project 
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basis. The rationale behind this is similar to, for example, the application of procedural 
Programmatic Agreements in the United States, that allow for generic decision-making on several 
environmental issues for a category of similar projects (CEE, 2010). As a national policy officer 
explains “by taking this up collaboratively we finally found a way to move beyond individual project 
scrutiny”. Both the implementation of the compensating measures and external developments 
have to be monitored on an annual basis from 2009 till 2015. In case the air quality deteriorates 
beyond European norms, the stakeholders agreed to jointly undertake additional measures to 
compensate for these events. Because of the NSL, the study area for infrastructure projects could 
be narrowed down, as effects outside the study area would be compensated by the NSL.  
In the meantime, the A4 project did not only become part of the NSL, it was also incorporated in 
the Urgent Approach Programme (Programma Spoedaanpak, [PS]). The establishment of this 
programme was part of the Acceleration Law and focused on the construction of 30 projects, 10 of 
which had to be finished before May 2011. Similar initiatives can be found around the globe. In 
the United States the ‘Everyday Counts’ programme has been established, in which “reducing the 
time it takes to deliver highway projects” (FHWA, 2013) is an important element. Based on the 
same rationale as the Everyday Counts programme in the United States and the PS in the 
Netherlands, the New South Wales government in Australia has introduced new legislation (for 
example, Restart NSW and the Planning Bill 2013) and established new regulatory bodies and 
advisory bodies (for example, Infrastructure NSW) all to accelerate the realization of priority 
infrastructure projects (see, e.g. Dobbs et al., 2013). 
The PS in the Netherlands consists of 30 that projects were considered to be bottlenecks in the 
existing infrastructure network. From a network an infrastructure network perspective, these 
bottlenecks could be solved by relatively minor adjustments. These adjustments, however, as the 
A4 Burgerveen – Leiden shows, could imply rather large projects. The PS was aimed at speeding 
up the projects’ decision-making process. Time was considered the essential scarce resource, 
which had to be managed carefully. As a national policy officer mentions “the phrase ‘time is of the 
essence’ really got a new meaning”: Every two weeks the programme team would consider the 
different projects. A detailed time planning was made, establishing project milestones. Delays 
were immediately reported to the Ministry’s executive agency’s top management and to the 
Minister of Transport himself. To enable speedy decision making, additional financial and 
personnel resources were provided.  
As a result of these developments, a new Final Route Decision was issued in 2009. Remarkably, 
this was almost exactly the same Final Route Decision as in 2007. The only difference was the fact 
that “the most recent data was included to support the decision. […] Road design has not been altered” 
(V&W, 2009, p. 7). The environmental interest group went to court again. However, given the 
developments on programme-level, outside the project scope, this time, the court no longer 
considered their objections to be valid, and so the project is currently being constructed.  
In the next section, we focus more in-depth on the role the different programmes have played in 
enabling project implementation. We are particularly interested in the ability of programmes in 
dealing with the complexities encountered on project level. 
5. Analysis: programme influences on project complexities  
Although the legal complexities were too large to handle on project level, the A4 project was able 
to deal with other types of complexity. Here, we focus more specifically on how the project dealt 
with these complexities and in what way programmes were able to support project delivery 
eventually. We aim to gain insight into the impact of programmes on the different forms of 
complexity. 
We first focus on the project level. Immediately after the project scope was defined in 1998, it 
encountered severe social complexities. Various important stakeholders were opposing the 
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project. In line with the political mandate, the Ministry of Transport had selected the option that 
would deliver most value for money taking little account of contextual developments. As a 
former alderman mentions, “the Ministry of Transport thought that they could realize the project only 
as they liked. They thought they could push the project through. We, as decentralized governments, really 
proved them wrong, although we had to use all our powers of persuasion to stop them”. Eventually, this 
resulted in a deadlock. Rather than following the procedural line and wait for stakeholders to 
come to the Ministry, to deal with the social complexities, the Ministry needed to be pro-active 
and find ways to reach consensus. As depicted in figure 4, this entailed a shift from internal focus 
on project management towards a more receptive and consensus-seeking and context-sensitive 
approach as also identified in section two. The aim of this approach was to develop a project 
scope that all involved parties could agree on (Van Duin, 2008). Because the expanded project 
scope was oriented towards regional and cross-sectoral integration, all public stakeholders could 
gain something (Thissen, 2005). Furthermore, in the advanced highway design, the social 
circumstances of the local residents would improve as the air quality would increase and the 
noise nuisance would decrease. However, the aim of these deliberations was still to provide a 
predefined output, accompanied by a definable time schedule and financial budget. Because of 
the extensive consultation, it was expected that this scope would remain stable throughout the 
rest of the project. All stakeholders had to stick to their deals.  
By adopting this communicative planning approach, the Ministry of Transport was able to deal 
with most of the social complexities. This did, however, influence technical and financial 
complexities. Even in its old design, the project was considered technically complex. Next to the 
road expansion it included the alteration of several structures such as bridges and aqueducts 
(V&W, 1997). The scope changes meant that now a total of 1.4 kilometers of highway had to be 
constructed in a trench, which would be largely covered by horizontally placed noise barriers 
that would reduce visual intrusion effects. Possible future road expansion was already taken into 
account in the design of the new road. In addition, the project also entailed more and improved 
connections for local, slow and waterway traffic to increase accessibility of the whole region. 
Despite the increased technical complexities, these complexities proved to be manageable on 
project level through the application of traditional management strategies. As a project manager 
explains “taking account of these stakeholder wishes of course influenced the project scope. However, we 
were always very focused on ensuring that we could really deliver to what we agreed. It has been 
challenging, but we have always found a way to keep to live up most stakeholder demands.” 
Although financial complexities proved to be a source of heavy dispute, eventually, they also 
proved to be manageable on project level – see Table 1. Complexities originate in the extensive set 
of financial arrangements between partners. For example, construction fees paid by the Ministry 
of Transport to the municipalities would be reinvested in the project. The same goes for the 
Ministry’s financial contribution to compensate for damage to local water- and ecosystems. In 
addition, the increased value of land near the road would be captured and be reinvested by the 
municipalities involved. However, as the project was halted in 2007, and planned roadside real 
estate could not be realized, municipalities ran into financial trouble. A stakeholder manager 
involved in the project, also states that “agreements were made in economic high times, when property 
value was expected to exponentially grow. When the crisis hit, the smaller municipalities involved in the 
project really felt this”. In 2008, the municipality of Leiderdorp was even prepared to go to court to 
try and reduce their financial contribution. Eventually, this problem was solved by reducing 
municipalities’ contributions and increasing that of the Ministry by € 17 million (RWS, 2009). All 
in all, the total costs of the scope alterations amounted to € 94 million vis-à-vis a total budget of € 
684 million (I&M, 2013). It was possible to secure the additional funding for the project because in 
the meantime the project had become part of the Urgent Approach Programme (Programma 
Spoedaanpak, [PS]).  
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This development reflects the shift away from focusing on the delivery of a specified output, 
towards focusing on a desired end state or outcome, as identified in section 2. Arrow 2 in Figure 
4 depicts this shift schematically. To enable this outcome, thirty projects that were about to be 
realized, but somehow encountered delay along the way had been selected in the PS. The 
programme aimed to overcome these sources of delay and to put pressure on project delivery. As 
was the case in the highway A4, this meant that additional funding had to be realized.  
In addition to funding, other organizational means were appointed to the programme. In line 
with recommendations made by the Committee Elverding (2008), projects were supported by 
well-trained and experienced staff. “The best people were collected and put on those projects”, as 
denoted by a national policy officer. The idea was to meet all preconditions to enable quick 
project delivery. In these projects, time was identified to all organizations as the essential 
resource (Van Beurden, 2010; Arts, 2010). This also called for a different legal strategy. Usually, 
the Ministry of Transport chooses a risk-averse legal strategy. This means, for example, that 
construction does not start before all possible legal objections are eliminated. This often resulted 
in project implementation delays. Under the PS, when protesters had litigated the project, an 
analysis of their objections was made. Based on this, a decision would be made to either start 
construction immediately, or to await the court’s decision. This strategy resulted in construction 
starting immediately after the (revised) Final Route Decision had been sent out in all thirty 
projects, including the A4 between Burgerveen and Leiden. As a national policy officer explains 
“time was the main focus. Within the programme we were very focused on finding possible ways to 
expedite project delivery”. 
Partly, all this was possible because the National Collaboration Programme on Air Quality 
(Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit, [NSL]) had been developed. As discussed 
above, this programme took away what proved to be the most successful argument to halt 
infrastructure project implementation: air quality legislation. “With the NSL we could finally build 
again”, as said by a provincial policy officer. A joint effort by all levels of administration, the NSL 
was supposed to take sufficient measures to mitigate air quality effects of all infrastructure 
projects. Unlike the PS, the NSL does not focus on internal programme management that is often 
aimed at speeding up project implementation. Rather, it concentrates on ensuring that European 
air quality standards will be met despite infrastructure projects being completed in the 
Netherlands. To do so, the programme focuses on collaboration between all stakeholders and on 
external developments (Busscher et al., 2014). To make sure that standards are met, for instance, 
also autonomous and international developments have to be taken into account.  
In the case of the A4 Burgerveen-Leiden we can see both shifts identified in planning practice 
that were depicted in figure 1. On the one hand, with the establishment of the W4 collaboration, 
the project represents a shift towards a more communicative approach (arrow 1 in Figure 4). On 
the other hand, with the establishment of the PS the project also shows a shift towards a 
programme-oriented planning approach (arrow 2 in Figure 4). Interestingly, the NSL appears to 
represent an additional alternative to the conventional project planning approach. As figure 4 
depicts, in relation to the other planning approaches, this approach can be situated in the upper 
right corner as it entails both a focus on external developments as well as an outcome instead of 
an output orientation (arrow 3 in Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Shift in planning approach in the case of the A4 Burgerveen-Leiden 
What both the PS and the NSL programmes seem to share is that they provide a platform for 
debate about complexities amongst politicians. Both programmes were able to raise project-
bound debate to a higher, more strategic policy level. The NSL proved to be a means to overcome 
the detailed scrutiny of individual project influence on the air quality. Instead of trying to 
calculate the exact possible project emissions, the programme focused on the cumulative impact 
of all projects (Arts et al., 2010). As a result, political attention focused on developing both generic 
and location-specific mitigating measures. This no longer had to be done on a project-by-project 
basis. By taking the political debate to programme level, projects could proceed again: “we were 
finally relieved from the constant political discussions about individual projects and which effects the 
project could or could not have on the regional air quality”, as stated by a national policy officer. 
The PS influenced the political complexity in a different way. As this programme was among the 
responsible Minister’s focal points, he was eager to make it work: “He was a source of inspiration 
due to his enthusiastic involvement in the programme” (RWS, 2011, p. 1). Similar to the NSL, political 
debate focused on the programme, and no longer on the project. Combining 30 different projects 
into one programme enabled the Minister to make a more substantial political claim as delaying 
decisions at project level would influence progress on programme level. He was able to frame the 
political debate in such way that the costs of holding back the programme would not weigh up to 
potential individual gains. As a consequence, potential further delays were prevented and the 
project gathered momentum.  
This is also reflected in the fact that what initially took from 1999 till 2007, in terms of 
stakeheholder consultation, could now be realized in less than two years. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to see that after the project became part of the programmes, the scope as well as the 
costs of the project remained rather stable, after historic estimates differed from € 480 million in 
2002 (V&W, 2002) till € 685 million in 2006 (V&W, 2006). Together, the programmes were able to 
prevent further delays and in this way also an important source of cost overruns. The 
programmes not only raised political discussion beyond the project level to the programme level 
and by doing this, also structured, political decision-making, but also provided clarity to all 
Internal focus External focus 
Output 
Outcome 
Conventional Project:  
focus only on national highway 
A4 
Public Public Partnership: 
From A4 to W4 
Urgent Approach Programme: 
Project considered as 
interlinked to 30 other projects  
National Collaboration 
Programme on Air Quality:  
Project stakeholders collaborate 
with different levels of 
administration to jointly 
compensate for pollution 
1 
2 
3 
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stakeholders what needed to be done in order to live up to environmental rules and regulations. 
This had a stabilizing effect on the project: in the period from 2006 till 2013 the total cost estimate 
in 2006 remained more or less the same. Nowadays, it is expected that the total costs of the 
project amount to € 684 million (I&M, 2013).  
Table 2. Programme influence on complexities on project-level 
Complexities: Programme impact  
 National Collaboration Programme 
on Air Quality [NSL] 
Urgent Approach Programme [PS] 
Technical Limited. Programme did not 
influence project scope 
By putting well trained and 
experienced staff forward 
Social Limited. Programme did not 
influence discussion among 
stakeholders 
Limited. Programme did not 
influence discussion among 
stakeholders 
Financial Limited. Programme did not 
influence financial budget, yet 
estimated project costs remained 
stable after inclusion in the 
programme 
By providing additional funding. 
Estimated project remained stable 
after inclusion in the programme 
Political By taking away political discussion 
on air quality matters 
By explicitly linking the 
programme progress to individual 
project progress 
Legal By taking away legal objections 
based on air quality regulations 
Limited. Programme did not 
influence related rules and 
regulations. 
6. Conclusion 
As Table 2 shows, we have distinguished five different types of complexity that influence project 
performance. These are: technical, social, financial, political and legal complexity. On the basis of 
a case study into the A4 Burgerveen – Leiden highway project, we were able to provide insight 
into how a the conventional project planning approach struggles to deal with these complexities. 
In order to deal with these complexities, planning theory and literature often advocates a more 
communicative project planning approach. Our case analysis shows that this approach is indeed 
able to deal with some of the identified complexities. As has been demonstrated in the case of the 
A4, building consensus through the integration of multiple stakeholder wishes proved to be 
effective to deal with social complexities. At the same time, however, this resulted in changes of 
the project scope. Subsequently, this influences technical and financial complexities. Interestingly, 
in order to deal with the increased technical and financial complexities traditional project 
management strategies were applied.  
At the same time, also the Urgent Approach Programme [PS] helped the A4 project to deal with 
these complexities. This programme consists of 30 projects that are considered to be bottlenecks 
in the infrastructure network and can be solved through relatively simple adjustments. All these 
projects have to be implemented within the same timeframe. Maylor et al. (2006) describe such a 
programme as a portfolio programme. As Maylor et al. (2006) argue, the portfolio type nature of 
the programme has also implications for the type of programme management (see also Busscher 
and Arts, 2011). In portfolio programmes, programme management is often focused on 
prioritization of shared resources between the various projects (Engwall and Jerbrant, 2003; PMI, 
2013). In the case of the A4 Burgerveen - Leiden, this is resembled in the fact that in relation to the 
project, the programme predominantly influences the technical and financial complexities. In 
fact, this type of programme management is strongly related to project management. Due to its 
internal focus, the aspects of scope, time and costs that Engwall (2002) characterized as central to 
the conventional project planning approach, are also central to the programme-oriented planning 
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approach. While this is in line with theoretic thinking on programmes (see, e.g. Lycett et al., 2004; 
Pellegrinelli, 2011), the fact that the PS was also able to deal with political complexities in 
planning practice is new. Through explicitly connecting the A4 project to other projects, political 
discussions that would potentially hold one project, would now hold all 30 projects. No politician 
wanted to get blamed for this. This shows how programmes as the PS can be a powerful 
instrument in order to speed up decision-making in relation to political complexities. 
This also applies for the National Collaboration Programme on Air Quality [NSL]. In this 
programme various involved stakeholders all agreed to undertake joint measures to deal with air 
quality issues. Following the typology of Maylor et al (2006), this programme can be seen as 
networked in nature. According to Maylor et al (2006), this implies that the programme 
management strategy has to be oriented towards collaboration between multiple parties. This is 
also reflected in the NSL by the fact that the involved stakeholders together agree upon joint 
action and in this way structure the context in which the project has to be implemented, and also 
structure political decision-making. However, this not only applies to political complexities, it 
also applies to legal complexities. Through the fact that the stakeholders together make sense of 
rules and regulations and together develop measures that are to be undertaken within the 
programme legal complexities are reduced. In addition, through focusing on the cumulative 
outcome of the entire programme, the NSL also proved to be able to restructure exiting 
environmental rules and procedures and prevent the need for individual project scrutiny. In turn, 
this allowed for fast legal approval on the project without the need to either undertake extensive 
studies or develop expensive project-bound mitigating measures to ensure compliance to strict 
environmental rules and regulations.  
This shows that through structuring the context of the project, programmes prove to be able to 
deal with financial, legal and political complexities. Programmes seem to be able to stabilize the 
context in which the project has to be implemented and ensure the right preconditions for a 
successful conventional project planning approach. In other words, the main function of the 
programmes seems to be to serve as a ‘firewall’ and protect project implementation from possible 
contextual developments such as legislation, political discussion or other complexities that could 
interfere with project delivery. In this way, programs impact project performance regarding 
scope, time and cost. However, this is not done by creating additional oversight and control as 
perhaps would be expected on the basis of traditional programme management literature, but by 
providing essential preconditions and creating a stable environment so that project management 
techniques can be effectively applied. 
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